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Abstract
Statements of and advocacy for interculturalism always seems to begin with a
critique of multiculturalism and aspire to offer a new and alternative paradigm of
diversity and citizenship. With particular reference to a recent publication, which
marks the current state of the art debate between the two ‘isms’, I suggest that
the critique is often not based on an engagement with multiculturalist authors but
targets popular (mis)perceptions of multiculturalism. A consequence of this is that
interculturalists fail to appreciate the limitations of their critique and of their claim
to novelty. The newness of interculturalism may relate to the normative significance
of the majority but less to intercultural dialogue or to an anti-essentialism. While
interculturalism has a contribution to offer, eg, by a focus on micro-level interactions,
on superdiversity and by challenging multiculturalists to think about the majority,
it is best understood as a version of multiculturalism rather than as an alternative
paradigm. Multiculturalism can benefit from the contribution of interculturalism but
this may involve moderating interculturalist ideas so, for example, not abandoning
an anti-essentialism that is consistent with the sociological reality of groups, or by
taking on board the normative significance of the majority but without accepting
the idea of a majority precedence. In this way what is of value in interculturalism
can be taken on board within existing multiculturalist theoretical frameworks.
For over a decade there have been a stream of academic and policy publications intro-
ducing and promoting a pro-diversity strategy of integration called Interculturalism
(IC). They joined a popular dissatisfaction with political Multiculturalism (MC) even
to the extent of defining MC in terms of its demotic understanding and initially ignor-
ing the political theory of MC.1 This disinterest has proved difficult to maintain as in
recent years theorists of MC have begun to respond to the IC critique and the claim
that IC is an intellectual improvement upon MC (beginning with Kymlicka, 2007 and
Meer & Modood, 2012). Consequently, a debate has emerged in which I think each
side has something to learn from the other and mutual provocation promises to im-
prove the quality of each ‘ism’, including requiring IC to express itself as a political the-
ory and not just in terms of policies and empirical studies in relation to say, education,
the creative industries or urban governance. The collection of essays, Multiculturalism
and Interculturalism: Debating the Dividing Lines (Meer, Modood & Zapata-Barrero,
2016) is to date perhaps the best expression of this new debate, a kind of ‘state of the
art’ were it not that the debate is not yet so developed as to merit such a term.
The central claim of IC is that it is a new paradigm which is superior to MC and
should replace it. It is argued that ‘multicultural policies are not fit for purpose’ and
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that ‘interculturalism is based upon an entirely different conceptual and policy
framework and offers a new and progressive approach to how we learn to live with di-
versity’ (Cantle, 2016a, p. 133). For Zapata-Barrero, there is ‘a new paradigm that is tak-
ing shape in this second decade of the twenty-first century: intercultural citizenship’
(Zapata-Barrero, 2016, p. 53). Advocacy for IC not only always begins with a critique of
MC but a dubious characterisation of MC, as has been observed by one of the non-IC
leading critics of MC, who notes that ‘the intercultural alternative rests on a polemical
view of multiculturalism that few of its advocates would endorse’ (Joppke, 2017, p. 37).
This is a theme I have dealt with a number of times (eg., Meer & Modood, 2012;
Meer & Modood, 2013; Modood, 2014; Modood, 2016a; Modood, 2017 and Modood &
Meer, 2012) and will here draw or build on these earlier works. This self-referencing
arises out of a combination of defending my work and, alternatively, not over-repeating
it and hence offering the reader the references to where more argument can be found.
My argument has been that while there is not one version of IC – in fact there are at
least two quite different versions, which are not compatible with each other (as Cantle
2016a, p.140 notes)2 – they do not offer an alternative political theoretical framework
to MC but rather emphasise certain aspects of MC (while de-emphasising or rejecting
altogether certain other aspects of MC), including ones that MCs have neglected, and
so some aspects of each version is helpful to MC, and MCs should take on board. I
have however, insisted that IC in most respects is not a new political theoretical frame-
work as some of its key ideas were already part of MC as a political theory, sometimes
foundational to it; and where they are new – to at least my version of MC – such as
the idea of majority precedence/recognition, they are, suitably revised, compatible with
MC and should be taken up by MCs. Whatever the political or rhetorical benefits in
dropping the term ‘MC’ and repackaging its ideas as ‘IC’ (Kymlicka, 2016), it is intellec-
tually mistaken to accept IC as new and superior to MC. The reason that ICs cannot
see this is because they do not really engage with the political theory of MC – or even
its policies (Modood, 2016a) – but with a stereotype of MC. Without repeating previ-
ous publications I would like to revisit this contention by looking in some depth at cer-
tain key ideas of MC in order to demonstrate that IC negative characterisations of MC
may resonate with stereotypes and ‘common perceptions’ (Bouchard, 2016; Zapata-
Barrero, 2016) but are not true of the political theory of MC. As I have been arguing
for multiculturalism as a political idea, movement, discourse, a set of policies and a
conception of Britishness for about thirty years a certain defensiveness will be evident
here. As the raison d’etre and self-justification of IC is based on a critique of MC, a
MC engagement with IC inevitably has to be reactive and defensive, and indeed, self-
referential. My argument is two-fold: much of the intellectual content of IC consists of
a critique of MC; and this critique ignores or misrepresents the published work of MCs
like myself.
I will focus primarily on my own theorisation of MC, developed with particular refer-
ence to the debates and experiences of Britain and with particular reference to, and ef-
forts to accommodate, British Asian Muslim political assertiveness and which
generically I have called “multicultural citizenship”3 and specifically, “multicultural
Britishness”.4 It is a form of multicultural nationalism centred on equal citizenship that
cherishes historical identities—minority and majority—and embraces what some might
call conservative institutions such as the House of Lords and state-funded faith schools,
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as well as new yearnings such as new hybrid identities or the celebration of St. George’s
Day as a national day for England (Modood, 2010, pp. 113–115) but insists on their ex-
tension or adaptation to include ethno-religious groups and identities. I know my con-
ception of multicultural nationalism owes much to several prominent authors (most
notably Bhikhu Parekh and Charles Taylor), but perhaps it is not identical to any one of
them and in any case cannot be held to be representative of political multiculturalism
per se.5 I should add however that I do not see my position as one that only exists in
theory. It is grounded in the British experience, which has progressively evolved since
the 1960s and is centred on civil society activism and public debates after The Satanic
Verses Affair to include Muslims in British public life (Stokke & Lybaek, 2016). It is
best represented in policy terms in the report of the Commission on Multi-Ethnic
Britain (2000, aka as the Parekh Report, after its chair) and in the actions of the first
New Labour government of 1997—2001 (Modood, 2016a). The discussion here, how-
ever, will be mainly at a theoretical level and with relatively limited country-specific ref-
erence (though some at the end). The theory in question has thus a form of idealisation
(as per Weber’s ‘ideal types’) drawn from a concrete experience and so fits that experi-
ence better than any other but to what extent it fits other cases is an open empirical
question not discussed here.
While this paper is explicitly a response to certain IC claims and inaccuracies I do
not wish it to be merely backward looking or merely defensive and so will offer a devel-
opment of certain ideas. I do claim, however, that these developments are in the main
based on ideas in the public engagement pieces in Modood (1992) (collecting items
published during 1988–1992), the essays collected in Modood (2005) (originally pub-
lished during 1996–2003) and Modood (2007/2013) and so pace Cantle are not ‘hasty
revisionisms’ (Cantle, 2016a, p. 140).6 I note, however, that while my MC is a target of
IC critique it may not be an unambiguous one. Firstly, some IC critique is explicitly not
engaged with academic publications. Bouchard, for example, says that the MC he has
in his sights is not the multiculturalism of theorists but of ‘the common perception’,
namely, ‘the most widespread perception of multiculturalism currently in the West’
(Bouchard, 2016, pp. 90-91). On the other hand, I seem to be included as a target of
critiques, especially by Cantle (2012b; 2013; 2016a and 2016b). Moreover, Nasar Meer
and I are charged with hastily revising MC in the light of IC and pretending therefore
that IC is only saying what MC has been saying all along: ‘claims that the new princi-
ples of interculturalism were ‘foundational’ to multiculturalism all along (Meer &
Modood, 2012, p. 182) reflect this hasty revisionism’ (Cantle, 2016a, p. 140). Finally,
the ambiguity I am referring to is compounded by the fact that some MC I endorse is
also endorsed by Cantle and according to some authors I am quite close to a version of
IC. Thus Cantle critiques the Quebecan IC, Bouchard thus: ‘Bouchard (2011) mirrors
much of the reified, static and defensive form of identity management found in
European forms of multiculturalism, whereas the Canadian government form of
‘multiculturalism’ is a little closer to the European idea of interculturalism’ (Cantle
2016a, p. 140). This is despite my beginning my 2007 book by offering Canadian
government MC as an exemplar (Modood, 2007, pp. 16–17). At the same time Iacovino
suggests that my understanding of (British) multiculturalism is closer to Quebecan IC
than Canadian MC and closer also to Quebecan IC than Cantle’s IC is (Iacovino, 2016,
p. 492). So, a more plural and complex conceptual map of MCs and ICs would have to
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be offered but I will not attempt to do that here, though the debate book that is my
main reference point itself offers several rival conceptual maps (Meer, Modood, &
Zapata-Barrero, 2016); see also Levey (2017).
Given all this one might wonder if there is anything that can be nailed down here as
comprising the difference between MC and IC. The editors of the 2016 book, compris-
ing of two committed to MC and one to IC suggest this list:
i) the status of dialogue, contact and interpersonal relations within respective
approaches.
ii) the position of historical majority cultural forms – or majority precedence.
iii)The normative significance of recognising groups in addition to individual citzens.
iv) The status of minority religious communities and organisations.
I have on many occasions written about the centrality of ethno-religious minorities to
contemporary multiculturalism and so I will leave that aside here and offer some
thoughts on the other three as themes in the IC critique of MC.
Dialogue as foundational to multiculturalism
Zapata-Barrero has argued that the core of intercultural citizenship is ‘essentially
one basic idea: that the interaction among people from different diversity attribu-
tions matters, and that this has been overlooked by the multicultural citizenship
paradigm, which has mainly concentrated on ensuring the cultural rights of diverse
groups’ (Zapata-Barrero, 2016, p. 54). This indeed has been the central claim of IC
since it began as a critique of MC. Positively, IC posits ‘the public sphere as a con-
tact zone, and it is based on everyday personal experiences... concentrating on bar-
riers to interaction’ (Zapata-Barrero, 2016, p. 56). Meer and Modood (2012)
responded by arguing that this overlooks that dialogue is a foundational concept of
MC, a suggestion rejected by Cantle (2016a).7 I continue to hold the view that dia-
logue in the context of identity-based tensions and the remaking of identity-based
public sphere and citizenship has been at the heart of MC, so, let me explain the
above point in some further depth.
To understand the foundational character of dialogue in multiculturalism, it is best
to understand it as a deliberate contrast to the dominant way of doing Anglophone pol-
itical theory in the last quarter of the twentieth century, in which John Rawls was the
most important theorist. He looks to found politics and social justice on what free, ra-
tional individuals would collectively agree to after discussion. The discussants should
be able to focus on what is good for individuals in general, or to put it differently, what
all individuals would want after reflection, not only on what individuals like themselves
would want. They must think selflessly—literally. Rawls designs a thought experiment,
the centrepiece of which is what he calls “the Veil of Ignorance” (Rawls, 1971). For the
deliberation of individuals to lead to the discovery of social justice or ‘fair terms of so-
cial cooperation’ (Rawls, 1985, p. 232) they must be made ignorant—stripped—of their
specific identities such as their gender, their class, their nationality, culture, religion
and so on. So none of the reasoners knows for example whether they are rich or poor,
black or white, Christian or Muslim and so on. So no one will risk favouring laws and
policies that unduly favour a particular class, race or religion in case when, at the end
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of the deliberation, the Veil is lifted and they (re)learn who they are, it turns out they
are not of the group they favoured.
Rawls’ claim is, then, that the principles of social justice can only be worked out by
individuals, intellectuals, law–makers, benign governments and so on to the extent that
they approximate to being self–less or identity–less reasoners. That, however, means
that dialogue among such individuals is not necessary because, stripped of all their dif-
ferences, such reasoners are identical. One reasoner can in theory come up with the
just solution without there having to be a dialogue among all the citizens. Moreover,
behind the Veil of Ignorance, the debate makes no difference to what is valuable in the
product of the debate. The product—the principles that a diverse society should live
by—are not influenced by who is or is not included in the debate, and so they remain
the same however the debate goes. That is to say, they are not influenced by the debate
and could indeed have been known without any dialogue having taken place. More
precisely, they are known by reason not by dialogue or by who participates in the
dialogue.
Multiculturalists have rejected abstract reasoning by a sole reasoner or identical iden-
tity–less individuals in favour of dialogue. They assume that the context for politics is
already thoroughly imbued with dominant ways of thinking and doing—with cultural
orientations such as national history and language, with religious and/or secular per-
spectives, with institutional norms and so on—and that these contextual factors cannot
be abstracted out so as to identify a set of principles of justice independent of cultural
interpretations. Moreover, the relationship between the relevant parties is likely to in-
volve domination–subordination or inclusion–exclusion and that the weaker or newer
party is likely to lack recognition or be misrecognised (Taylor, 1994).8 Dialogue rather
than identity–less reasoning will be relevant here for at least three reasons. Firstly, the
solution to the problem, or the arriving of a principle by which to address the problem,
needs an effort at cross–cultural understanding. It is not just a question of taking ma-
terial interests into account, but a matter of (re) designing the shared public space and
rules of conduct so diverse cultural commitments and needs are explicitly taken into
account. So that the public space does not simply reflect the dominant culture, but is
opened up to accommodate new or marginalised minorities. Secondly, this means that
the solution is genuinely open. By this I do not mean that “anything goes”. Rather, that
the solution cannot be predicted in advance in the way that, say, the final step of a
piece of mathematical reasoning can, of which we say the answer was there all along
waiting to be discovered. The dialogue makes a difference: it contributes to a growth of
understanding that genuinely is novel or additional to what was present before and the
quality or character of the dialogue is dependent on the participants. Not simply in
terms of their power of reasoning but in terms of “where they are coming from”, so
that with different parties a different outcome would have been reached. Thirdly, the
dialogue is important not just in discovering an outcome, but in building a relationship
of trust, co–operation and ultimately of belonging together between parties to the
dialogue.
The multiculturalist political theorists I have in mind include Iris Young, who assisted
people to understand themselves as oppressed and to discover themselves in collective
identities such as black or gay and to thus develop a liberatory identity and group polit-
ics and using it to engage with other groups to institute a new form of democratic
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politics (Young, 1990). Charles Taylor’s idea of a dialogical ethics and politics based on
“recognising” those whose distinct cultural identities have been dismissed, held in con-
tempt or whose preservation is at stake—such as the identities of African–Americans
in the USA or Francophone Quebecers in Canada—too is an example (Taylor, 1994).
Interestingly, in his more recent work Taylor relates his approach to diversity to a
Rawlsian idea, that of ‘an overlapping consensus’ (Rawls, 1987; Taylor, 2009).9 For
Rawls, this referred to the body of laws and policies that those with different religious
and cultural perspectives could all agree on by focusing on politics rather than their full
set of religious and value commitments. Taylor rejects the idea of the identityless self
(sometimes referred to as ‘the unencumbered self ’) and abstract reasoning as the
method for arriving at a consensus. He borrows and adapts ‘overlapping consensus’, but
makes the process of arriving at it much more expansive and dynamic so that it in fact
is best understood as consensus building; something not given but to be worked at, in-
cluding through new interpretations of actors’ points of views, one of the things that
one might expect from a dialogue (Taylor, 2009). James Tully has continually empha-
sised that cooperation under conditions of deep diversity or ‘multiplicity’ requires a
‘multilogue’ (Tully, 1995), and has proposed the idea of ‘public philosophy’, the ques-
tioning of society’s dominant assumptions in order to expose their contingency—their
lack of necessity—and so open the way to identifying other possible ways of thinking
and living (Tully, 2008).
Bhikhu Parekh explicitly makes intercultural dialogue central to his conception of
multiculturalism (Parekh, 2000/2006). His interventions in relation to The Satanic
Verses Affair, in which he argued against a freedom-of-speech absolutism and argued
that angry Muslims must be given a sympathetic hearing, are exemplary (Parekh, 1989).
While fully recognising that in such public controversies the majority dominate public
discourse, and often in a manner that is not conducive to dialogue or mutual learning,
he argues that multiculturalism is not about allowing each minority to-live-as-it-wishes
relativism (Parekh, 2000/2006). Rather, it is about ensuring that there is a genuine dia-
logue and that the minority is allowed to express its point of view. While such dia-
logues inevitably have a majoritarian or status quo starting point, because even while
wanting to express unfamiliar sensibilities and bring in new arguments, minorities are
primarily trying to persuade the majority. This often takes the form of a minority argu-
ing that what it is seeking is not so different to what the majority, at one time or an-
other, has sought for itself. In so arguing the minority must justify itself by appealing
to—even while seeking to modify—the existing ‘operative public values’ which structure
public debate and what is thought to be legitimate or reasonable in that polity at the
time (Parekh, 2000/2006, p. 267). I too have presented multiculturalism as a form of
dialogical citizenship (Modood, 2007/2013, pp. 126–128; 116–118).
This, then, is what I mean by saying that intercultural dialogue is central to multicul-
turalism, even foundational to it. This is not a hasty revisionism. What is true, however,
is that interculturalists have made their own distinctive addition; an emphasis on cul-
tural encounters and everyday interaction in localities, schools, clubs, public spaces. As
my example of the Rushdie Affair shows the importance of dialogue has been central
to multiculturalism but has been mainly thought of at the level of public discourses
and political controversies.10 Interculturalists have added the micro in terms of inter-
personal cultural encounters and group dynamics at the level of youth clubs,
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neighbourhoods, towns and cities (Meer & Modood, 2012). Thus the interculturalists’
contribution to diversity theory and practice is to neglect the significance of macro-
level dialogue, deny its presence as a multiculturalist [foundational] idea and to focus
exclusively on the micro (Cantle, 2012a).11
The reality of groups
For Cantle, it is not dialogue or the importance of interaction that is supposed to mark
the superiority of IC over MC. Rather, more fundamentally, ‘the key difference between
multiculturalism and interculturalism generaly revolves around the way in which per-
sonal and collective identities are conceptualised and instrumentalised.’ (Cantle 2016a,
p. 140). In MC ‘communitities [are] encouraged to view their identities as special and
fixed’ (p. 136) whereas IC recognises the present is characterised by superdiversity and
by multiple and fluid identities (pp. 140–143). This explains why ‘Interculturalism re-
acts against the process of political ethnicisation of people, and against considering eth-
nicity a given notion in categorising people’ (Zapata-Barrero, 2016a, p. 61), stands
against fixed categories and is able to allow hybridity to flourish (p. 59). Zapata-Barrero
endorses Rogers Brubaker’s critique of MC (amongst others) as suffering from ‘group-
ism’, namely the ‘tendency to treat ethnic groups, nations and races as substantial en-
tities to which interests and agency can be attributed’ (Brubaker, 2002, p. 164; Zapata-
Barrero, 2016, pp. 61–62). Apparently, according to Cantle, Meer and I have belatedly
come to accept this critique of MC: ‘The recent acceptance [ie., confession] of multicul-
turalism’s ‘groupist’ approach to identity (Meer & Modood, 2012) is to be welcomed,
but the majority of academic and policy literature on multiculturalism is founded on
the protection of ‘essentialised’, ascribed and static identity boundaries, in which these
‘pure’ forms are privileged’ (Cantle, 2016a, p. 142).
This is an old criticism in the subject area of equality and group identities, predating
IC and has been extremely successful. By successful I mean that everybody has been
persuaded, it is just about impossible to find anyone within the social sciences who
does not agree that such identities are not based on cognitive or behavioural properties
that are shared by all who may be members of a relevant group such as women, black
people, gay and lesbians and so on. If, then, group members do not share a common
essence then they cannot be simply demarcated from non-group members because
there will be many cases where individuals are not simply on one side of the boundary
or the other. So groups cannot have discrete, nor indeed, fixed boundaries as these
boundaries may vary across time and place, across social contexts and will be the sub-
ject of social construction and social change. Since about the 1980s onwards these
views have become increasingly widely accepted across the social sciences and I and
most multiculturalists are part of this overwhelming consensus, which I will refer to by
the term, ‘anti-essentialism’. Anti-essentialism is a powerful way of handling ascriptive
discourses, of showing that various popular or dominant ideas about women, gays or
Muslims are not true as such but are aspects of socially constructed images that have
been made to stick on to those groups of people because the ascribers are more power-
ful than the ascribed. The latter, in their variety, are not reducible to the essentialistic
generalisations and stereotypes that are characteristics of ascriptions but not of lived-in
identities. Anti-essentialism, then, is an intellectually compelling idea, and a powerful
resource in the cause of equality.
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Anti-essentialism, however, can be variously interpreted. Let me briefly rehearse two
interpretations which I discussed in my book, Multiculturalism (Modood, 2007/2013).
The first is the sceptical interpretation that the critique kills the groups as real entities
and they only live on as ascriptions or reactions to ascriptions or political make-
believe. For example, Brubaker (2005) argues that ‘ethnicity, race and nation are not
things in the world but perspectives on the world; ways of seeing, interpreting and
representing the social world’ (p. 17). This scepticism seems to underlie Zapata-
Barrero’s and Cantle’s endorsement of Brubaker’s critique of ‘groupism’ and ‘political
ethnicisation’, the view that appeals to culture and ethnicity are not about things in the
world but are perspectival impositions upon individuals who may wish to be free of
them.
Sceptics do not necessarily want to kill off worthwhile political projects around say a
black identity or feminism and so some allow for something called ‘strategic essential-
ism’ (Spivak, 1990; cf. Kristeva, 1981), where pretending that there is a black or national
identity is permitted because of the politics but analysts know that these identities are
only ‘necessary fictions’ (Hall, 1992, p. 254). Another way of doing it is that employed
by Anne Phillips in her book, Multiculturalism without Culture (Phillips, 2007), the in-
tellectual thrust of which, that cultural groups do not exist, simply transposes into ac-
commodating groups when it comes to politics, without any sense of obligation to
reconcile these divergent intellectual and political positions. I think groups are neces-
sary to both social science and to anti-racism or egalitarian politics and so I offered an
alternative interpretation of anti-essentialism. I suggested that Wittgenstein’s concept
of family resemblance offers a way of recognising that just as it does not make sense to
say that games or languages do not exist because they do not share a common, defin-
itional essence, so the lack of group essences and discrete, bounded populations with
unchanging characteristics was not a good reason to assert in an a priori way that
groups did not exist (Modood, 2007/2013, chapter 5).12 Rather, we had to have a more
flexible, looser and variable notion of a group and of group membership that allowed
for open-textured and overlapping boundaries and overlapping memberships. If it
seems difficult to reconcile this with our a priori concept of group, let us call the en-
tities, ‘groupings’. The key point was that once we stopped demanding that groups
measure up to our impossible definitions we would lose the temptation to conclude
that groups suffered from an ontological deficiency, that they were merely ‘perspectives
upon the world’, ontologically no superior to the products of Othering. The point is that
Cantle and other interculturalists are mistaken in saying that multiculturalists assume
that ethnic and religious minorities are discrete, bounded, static, homogeneous and
reifed entities. Rather, this is an old tactic of misrepresenting an opponent’s views, cri-
tiquing the misrepresentation and concluding that the opponent’s views have been
demolished.
Let us, however, return to the substantive question. Given, that the political theory
and sociology of multiculturalism speaks of ethnic groups (not necessarily in a pure or
singular form, but perhaps as or including the ethnoracial, ethnocultural, ethnoreligious
and so on), what does ethnicity refer to? Ethnicity here refers to a group that is very
likely to be subject to ascriptive ‘Othering’ yet which has an existence of its own and
not just as the imagined Other of someone else. Namely that in relation to a group de-
fined by descent there is an element of self-identification, and with it community norms
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and structures and the inter-subjectivity that constitutes a group or groupness. The
question, then, becomes can this ethnicity be given any content? In my book, Multicul-
tural Politics, I gave as illustration five dimensions of ethnic ‘difference’ that cannot be
reduced to Othering or to external explanations, so let me draw and expand on those
(Modood, 2005):
1. Cultural Distinctiveness: norms and practices such as arranged marriage, existence
of specific gender roles or a religion. Of course these norms and practices will to
some extent be contested within the group and will modify and perhaps even
disappear over time. The cultural distinctiveness therefore does not merely lie in
conformity but also in the fact that one feels one needs to engage with those
practices. The way that some Muslim women are reinterpreting Islamic gender
norms is a very good example.
2. Disproportionality: a group may be marked by a disproportional distribution of
a characteristic that is not distinctive (eg., high unemployment); while the
distribution may be a structural product of opportunities and obstacles within
the wider society, it can shape attitudes within the group, as well as to the
group, a sense that they are not typical but different (eg., poor, brainy, sporty
etc). Moreover, the disproportional presence or absence of certain ethnic
minorities in certain occupations may be to do with racism or features of a
particular labour market but they may also be due to, for example, an ethnic
group particularly favouring a certain profession (eg., medicine) or for example
not working with meat products.
3. Strategy: responses to a common set of circumstances (eg., high unemployment)
may lead some groups to become demotivated or politically militant or self-
employed; where differential strategies persist they can come to contribute to group
consciousness and to distinguish groups.
4. Creativity: some groups are identified with some innovations (eg., longer shop-
opening hours, a clothes style or a musical genre) even though they get taken up by
the mainstream.
5. Identity: membership of a group may carry affective meanings that may motivate or
demotivate, eg., black pride in a history of resistance to oppression, eg., as Muslims
we must aid fellow Muslims in a time of need.
All of these will be contingent on time and place, some may be true in a small
number of time-place contexts, some may be more pervasive – these are empirical
questions, part of what I called the ‘mode of being’ (as opposed to the ‘mode of oppres-
sion’), which is not a priori, transcendental, or asocial but is an object of multi-
disciplinary, multi-methods social scientific inquiry. In which case to say that ethnic
groups do not exist but are imposed by MC policies on heterogeneous populations is
philosophically naïve, sociologically false and a wilful misrepresentation of
multiculturalism.
As for the normative implications in relation to placing hybridity and fluidity over
the existence and recognition of groups, I have insisted that we should not approach
the question in the spirit of a binary. With minority ethnicities changing as a result of
social processes, identity politics and individual choices (Modood, Beishon & Virdee,
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1994), multiculturalism must embrace both hybridity and groups, while recognising
that the difficult normative and political questions for liberal democracies are in rela-
tion to the accommodation of ethno-religious groups (eg., Modood, 1998). I will not
repeat those discussions here but the next section discusses aspects of the normative
significance of groups.
The majority and multiculturalising national citizenship
Probably the most challenging IC idea for MC comes not from European versions
of IC but from Quebec (which some European ICs are uncomfortable with, eg.,
Cantle, 2016a, p. 140). It is the idea of ‘majority precedence’, namely, that at some
point or other, and without legal entrenchment, the rights of the majority may le-
gitimately trump the rights of minorities. Gerard Bouchard has offered a direct and
pithy statement of it in English (Bouchard, 2011). For him, the central feature of
IC is that it frames the question of diversity in terms of a majority-minority dual-
ity, not the plurality characteristic of multiculturalism (Bouchard, 2011, pp. 441–
445), and within this duality, there must be a clear, albeit non-legal, precedence.
“While seeking an equitable interaction between continuity and diversity, intercul-
turalism allows for the recognition of certain elements of ad hoc (or contextual)
precedence for majority culture” (Bouchard, 2011, p. 451). This is challenging for
multiculturalists because it would be fair to say multiculturalists of the kind being
defended here have not explicitly addressed the issue about the majority (though
see Levey, 2017). Multiculturalists have of course written much on the re-making
of a national citizenship in order to make it more inclusive (Modood, 2007/2013,
Uberoi, 2015a and 2015b), as that is central to multiculturalism as I understand
it13; and MC—certainly my own work—assumes that minority accommodation is to
take place in an ongoing historic nation-state. MC is not about opposing a given
nation-state but of co-operatively and dialogically adapting it and re-imagining it,
i.e., multiculturalizing it from the inside, ie., by citizens. So perhaps it is not en-
tirely accurate to say that multiculturalists have neglected to note the normative
significance of the majority tout court. Yet, on the whole, while the national cul-
ture is assumed as an appropriate normative context, multiculturalists do not expli-
citly discuss the concept of the majority or the idea of majority rights or
recognition.14 In so far as multiculturalists distinguish between the majority culture
and the public or civic culture, it is about the former’s tendency to dominate and
pass itself off as the whole of the national culture. It is assumed that a minority
culture can be identified as distinct from what it needs to be included into but
much less is said about the majority culture in this respect. I confess to being
guilty here. I have subsequently closely engaged with Bouchard’s argument for ma-
jority precedence and will not repeat that here but simply note that my conclusion
was that a case can be made for acknowledging that the majority, no less than mi-
norities, has a normative significance but not a special precedence (Modood, 2014).
Having admitted that multiculturalists like myself have not engaged much with the
concept of he majority, I would like to do two things here. Firstly, I will state what I
think has been the view of the concept of the majority implicit in MC. Secondly, I will
go beyond that to develop further the concept of a national multiculturalism that I have
advocated in the context of Britain.
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What I have said to date about minorities in relation to the majority can be sum-
marised in terms of two “protectionist” statements and two positive statements:
i) Protection from racism, cultural racism and Islamophobia (not from majority
culture per se)
ii) There should be no insistence on assimilation but nor should there be any
hinderance against uncoercive social processes of assimilation or self-chosen
assimilation; different modes of integration should be equally welcomed
iii)There should be multicultural accommodation of minorities within shared public
institutions
iv)Minorities should be able to make claims on the national culture and identity in
their own ways and this remaking of national identity is part of multicultural
citizenship and should be welcomed and encouraged by the majority.
So, while multiculturalists may need to think more about “the majority”, it is not the
case that existing theories are negative about majority culture per se or even that multi-
culturalism is about protecting minorities from majority culture. Rather the above list
allows us to note that one of the noticeable differences between MC and IC is the em-
phasis the former puts on anti-racism and beyond that to acknowledging the role of
the political, of contestations and the challenging of power relations.15 Furthermore,
one of the central arguments of MC, and implicit in the list, is that the majority culture
already has recognition of some sort—that is what is meant by saying the liberal state is
not neutral and does not have to be neutral—and so it is a matter of extending this val-
ued condition to minorities. MCs like me clearly accept that liberal democratic states
may promote a national culture (within liberal limits and respecting other group iden-
tities) and this would be of benefit to the society or polity as a whole. This is reflected
in the importance I give to both British national identity and the role that the state
may play in relation to it (Modood, 2007/2013, pp. 146–154/135–143). Moreover, it is
not an ad hoc addition but follows from the core of my position which puts a special
value on identity (Modood, 2007/2013, pp. 41–45/36–40). So, while Bouchard
categorises MC as insisting on “no recognition of a majority culture” (Bouchard, 2011,
pp. 441–442) I cannot be characterised as someone who considers appeals to majority
cultural heritage as illegitimate per se. The multiculturalist point is that the predomin-
ance that the cultural majority enjoys in the shaping of the national culture, symbols
and institutions should not be exercised in non-minority accommodating ways. So, the
goal is legitimate but the constraints are not just about traditional liberal freedoms of
the individual, which may be enough to ensure non-discrimination and non-coercive
assimilation, but also respect for post-immigration ethnoracial, ethnocultural and eth-
noreligious group identities. This respect is both a constraint on the kind of national
cultural identity building that may be pursued but, more positively, it is an opportunity
for creating a certain kind of national identity, namely one which includes those kinds
of group identities in the revised or reformed national identity, critically reforming but
without displacing the narrative of the majority within the national identity. Minorities
may wish to contest dominant narratives which exclude them or fail to respect them
and their contribution but they do not compete with the majority in a zero-sum game.
I have argued that the process should be seen as a kind of egalitarian levelling up,
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where the minorities come to share the public space, not a form of dispossession of the
majority. More positively still, that the accommodation of minorities should not be seen
as a drag on the national identity but as a positive resource; not as diluting the national
culture but vivifying and enrichening it. Whilst liberal nationalism is often offered in
relation to facilitating the solidarity that enables social democratic redistribution of re-
sources, the distinctive goal of multicultural nationalism is to allow people to hold,
adapt, hyphenate, fuse and create identities important to them in the context of their
being co-citizens and members of socio-cultural, ethnoracial and ethnoreligious
groups.16
Levey has suggested that my acceptance of the cultural predominance of the majority
is simply as an empirical fact and is not sufficiently normative (Levey, 2016, p. 211).
Yet, Bouchard (2015, pp. 111–112), recalling that the Bouchard-Taylor report spoke of
“de facto precedence” (Bouchard & Taylor, 2008, p. 214), himself abandons the term
“majority precedence” as he believes that the idea he wants to state “simply reflects the
historical demographic and sociological weight of the majority.” (Bouchard, 2015,
p. 140). So, perhaps there is at least an evolving strand of Bouchard’s thinking that
is converging on multiculturalism. In any case, let me give two examples to
illustrate the general points that I have been making about a multiculturalist pos-
ition in relation to national identity and the respective claims of the majority and
the minorities. The examples illustrate two different but complementary, indeed
mutually necessary, aspects of multiculturalism.
The Church of England is clearly an institutionalised feature of England’s and
Britain’s historical identity. This is reflected in symbolic and substantive aspects of the
constitution. For example, 26 Anglican bishops sit by virtue of that status in the upper
house of the UK legislature, the House of Lords. It is the Archbishop of Canterbury
that presides over the installation of a new head of state, namely the coronation of the
monarch. Given the rapidity of changes that are affecting British national identity, and
the way in which religion, sometimes in a divisive way, is making a political reappear-
ance, I think it would be wise not to discard lightly this historic aspect of British
identity, which continues to be of importance to many even when few attend Church
of England services and when that Church may perhaps have been overtaken by
Catholicism as the largest organised religion in the country. Yet, in my advocacy of
a multiculturalized Britain I would like to see the Church of England share these
constitutional privileges—which should perhaps be extended—with other faiths.
However, multiculturalism here does not mean crude “parity”. My expectation is
that even in the context of an explicit multifaithism the Church of England would
enjoy a rightful precedence in the religious representation in the House of Lords
and in the coronation of the monarch. This, however, would not be just a crude
majoritarianism nor based only on its historical significance but also on its actual
track record in furthering multiculturalism and its potential to play a leading role
in the evolution of a multiculturalist national identity, state and society. Both the
historical and the multiculturalist contributions to national identity have a
presumptive quality, and usually they qualify each other, but where they are com-
plementary the case for “establishment” is enhanced and most of all where there is
simultaneously a process of inclusion of non-Anglican faith communities and
humanists.17
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My second example is about religion in non-denominational state schools. I think
multiculturalism should support a compulsory religious education (RE) in which chil-
dren of all faiths and none are taught about a variety of faith traditions and their past
and current effects upon individuals and societies, upon the shaping of humanity,
taught to classes comprising those of all religions and those of none. Such classes
should certainly include the contribution of humanism as well as the atheistic critique
of religion and can be combined with ethics as is the case in Quebec. In many coun-
tries there are advocates for RE as part of a national curriculum.18 The main issue in
relation to majority precedence is in relation to religious instruction (RI), the induction
into a specific faith. Broadly speaking there are two majoritarian possibilities. We have
a society where there is a majority religion and that alone is allowed as RI, and minor-
ities might be exempted from those classes but no alternative religious instruction is
provided. Or secondly, the majority view is that there should be no RI in state schools,
as in the USA or in France (except in state-funded religious schools). Is it fair to im-
pose either of these policies on minorities that do want RI?
That is certainly an appropriate subject for a national dialogue but if after that certain
minorities want RI as well as RE, then a truly national system, certainly a multicultural
system, must make an effort to accommodate minority RI. In my understanding then,
under both the majoritarian possibilities the minorities should have their religions
instructed or worshipped within the national system. On the other hand, minorities do
not have the right to stop the majority from including the instruction of their religion.
We should not, for example, ask schools to cease Christian RI or worship or celebrating
Christmas because of the presence of Muslims or Hindus; rather, we should extend the
celebrations to include, for example, Eid and Diwali. Such separate classes and faith-
specific worship needs to be balanced with an approach that brings all the children to-
gether and into dialogue; indeed, without that it would be potentially divisive of the
school and of society. But where that is in place, voluntary pursuit of one’s own faith or
philosophical tradition completes the multiculturalist approach to the place of religion
in such schools. Learning together about different faiths, including what they have in
common and being instructed in or inducted into one’s faith community heritage as a
normal school occurrence and not something excluded from the school community are
then the two mutually balancing aspects of multiculturalism.
These two brief examples, then, illustrate what I take to be a multiculturalist recogni-
tion of the legitimate claims and limits of majority culture. The idea of majority prece-
dence, then, in the work of Bouchard and within Quebecan IC more generally is a
significant difference from most accounts of MC. Despite it containing a rather simplis-
tic account of MC that is not found in or even said to be found in the work of multi-
culturalists, the latter can benefit from engaging with it. Multiculturalists can accept
the starting point of Bouchard’s arguments in question but not the conclusions. The ar-
guments show that the majority culture has a normative significance, but not normative
precedence if that means the majority is able to make normative claims that minorities
are not, or that majority claims always trump minority claims, or that there is always
some prima facie presumption in favour of the majority culture. Engaging with these
arguments show that the kind of multicultural nationalism that I and Bhikhu Parekh
have been developing (though see Uberoi, 2015a and 2015b for the suggestion that
Parekh has a new and distinct understanding of national identity) have tended to take
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the majority for granted as a normative context without explicitly discussing it, yet
there is nothing in that MC that stands in the way of doing the majority justice. Indeed,
the opportunity to reflect on this theme makes me think that multicultural nationalism
is well placed to balance the normative identity claims of the majority and the minor-
ities that Quebecan ICs seek when they emphasise the importance of mutual recogni-
tion, reciprocity and balance, though they tend to go astray when they express this as
“majority precedence”.
Conclusion
Interculturalism seems to always begin with a critique of multiculturalism and as-
pires to be a new and alternative paradigm of diversity and citizenship. Too often
the critique is not based on an engagement with multiculturalist authors but tar-
gets common (mis)perceptions of multiculturalism. A consequence of this is that
interculturalists fail to appreciate the limitations of their critique and of their claim
to novelty. The alleged new ideas of interculturalism may relate to the normative
significance of the majority but less to intercultural dialogue or to an anti-
essentialism. While interculturalism has a contribution to offer, eg, by a focus on
micro-level interactions, on superdiversity and by challenging multiculturalists to
think about the majority, it is best understood as a version of multiculturalism ra-
ther than as an alternative paradigm. This allows for an appreciation of micro-
sociological studies without accepting the usual prefatory critique of multicultural-
ism found in such studies. My own version of multiculturalism can benefit from
the contribution of interculturalism but this may involve moderating interculturalist
ideas, for example, of not abandoning an anti-essentialism that is consistent with
the sociological reality of groups, or by taking on board the normative significance
of the majority without accepting the idea of a majority precedence. In this way
what is of value in interculturalism can be taken on board within existing multicul-
turalist theoretical frameworks.
Endnotes
1I will also use MCs and ICs to refer to multiculturalists and interculturalists
respectively.
2Zapata-Barrero (2016) believes there are three different versions of intercultural-
ism and which actually are three different complementary aspects of interculturalism.
Alternatively, if we want to go beyond Europe and Quebec, we can also note intercul-
turalidad in Latin America, which engages with the legacy of colonialism rather than
immigrant settlement (Solano-Campos, 2016).
3Of course Kymlicka had earlier described his own position in terms of multicul-
tural citizenship, this being the title of his pioneering book (Kymlicka, 1995).
4There is a major question whether such a citizenship based multiculturalism in
countries such as Canada, Australia and Britain can be extended to cover ‘pendular
migrant Polish plumbers, Chinese students who overstay, American high skilled
workers (in the UK) etc’ (as one anonymous referee put it), not discussed here but
extensively in Triandifyllidou in press (2017).
5In recent years Taylor, despite being one of the best known political theorists of
multiculturalism, has come to self-define as an interculturalist (Taylor, 2012).
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6Except, as I acknowledge later in the text, I have been stimulated by IC to think in
new ways about the normative significance of the majority. The single short piece I
would cite against the ‘hasty revisionism’ argument and as an indication of the under-
lying consistency in my understanding of multiculturalism is Modood (1998).
7I had actually earlier argued that ‘far from simply supporting difference, the multi-
cultural state may also need to encourage forms of social mixing and interaction,
though this will be a two-way process and not just in relation to simply avoiding minor-
ity segregation’ (Modood, 2007/2013, p. 64/ p. 59).
8An anonymous reviewer pointed out that Taylor’s recognition ‘is a one-sided rela-
tionship, a remedial act by the perpetrator toward the victim’. True, the recognition is
remedial, but moving from misrecognition to recognition requires dialogue to under-
stand the other as an other for itself and not just as an object. The effort to understand
the other as having a life or consciousness besides its subordinate role comes from one
side but requires an identity assertion communicated from the other side.
9At this stage Rawls had moved away from the Veil of Ignorance methodology de-
scribed earlier of his most famous work (Rawls, 1971).
10Though Parekh (2000/2006), gives some attention to the quotidian in a multicul-
turally constituted common culture (pp. 219–224/ p. 168).
11Loobuyck (2016, p. 230), too uses the macro-micro distinction to distinguish be-
tween IC and MC but he conflates it with a state—civil society distinction and does not
see that MC is not confined to the state and extends to citizen-to-citizen relations
(Modood, 2007/2013, chapter 6). Contrary to another distinction he makes, multicul-
turalism is not just about justice and neglects the importance of belonging: on the con-
trary, belonging is more central to multicultural nationalism as I understand it than
either the liberal goal of furthering autonomy or the social democratic means of redis-
tribution of resources.
12Parekh (2000/2006) has his own way of avoiding essentialism in relation to the
concept of culture (p. 144). See also the excellent Kymlicka (2015). Varun Uberoi has
pointed out to me that Iris Young’s discussion of the concept of a group (Young, 1990,
pp. 42–46) should be regarded as the earliest anti-essentialist discussion by a multicul-
turalist political theorist.
13Will Kymlicka has written extensively on the re-making of a national citizenship
but I hesitate to cite him here as I am mindful of Levey’s argument that Kymlicka is a
liberal nationalist and therefore not a parity multiculturalist and therefore is not a good
example of a multiculturalist that Bouchard is arguing against (Levey, 2016).
14For a path-opening discussion and typology of the majority, see Orgad (2015).
He, however, confines his normative discussion to uses of majority culture in relation
to just two areas of policy, namely, immigration and naturalisation. This is partly be-
cause his interest in “majority rights” is only in those that can be expressed in law. MC
is not only or even primarily focused on law and Bouchard, as stated above, is not argu-
ing for majority rights in law, and neither MC nor IC is primarily interested in immi-
gration and naturalisation but in state-citizen and citizen-to-citizen relations.
15For a very good example see Commission on Multi-Ethnic Britain (CMEB, 2000).
16A more fundamental difference between liberal nationalism and the multicultur-
alism I am defending is that the former usually places individual autonomy as the high-
est good but the latter is silent on the question of there being a single, highest good
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and operates at the level where a plurality of overlapping but also contested goods is
seen as part of the condition of politics.
17On the relationship between multiculturalism and moderate secularism, see
Modood (2016b).
18I appreciate that this will read oddly to US readers. They should bear in mind that
the US is not typical of how religion is treated in schools in the western democracies.
For example, all states of the European Union give funding either to religious schools
or for religious education in state schools (Stepan, 2011, p. 117).
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